The Replying Game:
Making the Case for Adopting the Fifth Circuit’s Use of
Particularized Replies in § 1983 Actions
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the
“Rules”) in 1938, a plaintiff attempting to avail herself of federal
court has, in most circumstances, needed only to plead a “short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
1
relief.” As the qualifier “in most circumstances” suggests, there are
2
exceptions; the question is whether § 1983 actions against
government officials for civil rights violations should be one of those
3
exceptions. Qualified immunity, a defense to § 1983 claims, often
∗
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1
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). This minimal pleading requirement is commonly
referred to as “notice pleading.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
Reversing dismissal for failure to plead specific facts, the Supreme Court determined
that “all the Rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim that will give the
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002). For a further exploration of notice
pleading, see infra Part II.D.
2
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private right of action against any “person” who,
acting “under the color of” state authority, violates the constitutional or federal
rights of a United States citizen. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). For a more in-depth
description of § 1983 claims, see infra Part III. A Bivens action, the federal analog to
a § 1983 action, may be brought by a citizen whose civil rights are violated by a
federal, rather than state, official. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Although this Comment focuses on § 1983 actions, the
logic, at least with regard to pleading standards, is equally applicable to Bivens
actions. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500-01 (1978) (acknowledging
that there is no justification for treating Bivens claims different from § 1983 claims in
most instances).
3
Qualified immunity is a judicially-created affirmative defense that must be
raised by the government defendant in the answer to a § 1983 claim. Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
It is available to government officials performing discretionary functions “insofar as
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provides government officials total freedom from suit, rather than
4
merely freedom from liability. Because of this, many lower federal
courts have struggled to find ways to dispose of civil rights cases at an
5
early juncture. Until recently, the majority of lower federal courts
responded by requiring that the plaintiff plead in factual detail at the
outset of the litigation; failure to do so resulted in a judgment on the
6
pleadings, ending the plaintiff’s action.
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court in
7
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit
8
and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. have severely undermined the practice
9
of demanding that the plaintiff plead specific facts in the complaint.
In Leatherman, the Court unanimously rejected a heightened pleading
10
standard when a § 1983 complaint is brought against a municipality.
The Court expressly declined to decide, however, whether a
heightened pleading standard was permissible in cases against

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982). For a further examination of immunity defenses, see infra Part III.
4
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (describing qualified immunity as
“an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability”).
5
See, e.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (advocating the early use of summary
judgment and holding that “[u]ntil this threshold immunity question is resolved,
discovery should not be allowed”); Elliot v. Thomas, 937 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992) (rejecting a heightened pleading standard
in favor of aggressive use of summary judgment); Connelly v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 876 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that the court must be able
at the outset of the litigation to ascertain with factual certainty what transpired).
6
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c); see also, e.g., Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep’t,
958 F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1992) (requiring plaintiff to meet a heightened pleading
standard in the complaint in suits “in which an immunity defense can be raised”);
Hunter v. Dist. of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 75-77 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (requiring
particularized pleading in all § 1983 claims regardless of whether the qualified
immunity defense is raised); Branch v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1991)
(adopting a “heightened pleading standard in [Bivens] cases in which subjective
intent is an element of a constitutional tort action”).
7
507 U.S. 163 (1993).
8
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
9
See infra Parts IV.C and D (discussing Leatherman and Swierkiewicz).
10
507 U.S. at 168 (1993) (“We think that it is impossible to square the
‘heightened pleading standard’ applied by the Fifth Circuit in this case with the
liberal system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules”). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained that municipalities have neither absolute
nor qualified immunity that would preclude a suit. Id. at 166. Rather, the primary
issue in a § 1983 claim against a municipality is whether the municipality’s officials
were acting in accordance with a municipal custom or policy when the alleged
constitutional injury occurred. Id.; see also infra note 232 (comparing § 1983 claims
against municipalities with those against government officials). For a further
discussion of Leatherman, see infra Part IV.C.
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11

government officials. Several courts have exploited this apparent
loophole by continuing to require that the complaint be
12
particularized in suits against officials.
In Swierkiewicz, the Court revisited the permissibility of a lower
court’s imposition of a heightened pleading standard despite no
express authority in the Rules, this time in the employment
13
discrimination context. The Court in Swierkiewicz, as in Leatherman,
did not directly address the appropriate level of specificity required
in a plaintiff’s complaint in a § 1983 suit against a government
14
official. The Court’s message, however, was unequivocal: absent a
statute or a Rule to the contrary, a federal court cannot on its own
15
authority insist on a heightened pleading standard.
After Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, the loophole by which some
lower federal courts have distinguished their heightened pleading
practices from those discredited by the Supreme Court is closing, if
16
17
not completely shut.
The Fifth Circuit, in Schultea v. Wood,
18
responded by devising a novel way of bringing to light specific
11

Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166-67.
For courts that have continued, post-Leatherman, to require a heightened
pleading standard in § 1983 actions against government officials, see, for example,
Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 907 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We have continued to apply this
heightened pleading requirement to § 1983 claims alleging a conspiracy between
private individuals and state officials even after Leatherman . . . .”); GJR Invs., Inc. v.
County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he heightened
pleading requirement is the law of this circuit.”). For courts that have rejected a
heightened pleading standard after Leatherman, see, for example, Atchinson v. Dist.
of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1
(1st Cir. 2002); Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996); Jordan v. Jackson, 15
F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 1994); Goad v. Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2002); Walker v.
Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002); Harris v. St. Louis Police Dep’t, 164 F.3d
1085 (8th Cir. 1998); Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir.
1994).
13
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508.
14
See id.
15
Id. at 515 (“A requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result
that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules and not by
judicial interpretation.’” (quoting Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168)). For a further
exploration of Swierkiewicz, see infra Part IV.D.
16
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has been particularly reluctant to
relinquish its heightened pleading standard for complaints alleging § 1983 claims
against government officials, but the circuit appears to have retrenched. See Marsh v.
Butler County, 225 F.3d 1243, 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000). For an excellent account
of the enduring uncertainty in the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisprudence in this area, see
Elizabeth J. Norman & Jacob E. Daly, Statutory Civil Rights, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1499,
1504-10 (2002).
17
47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
18
To be sure, Swierkiewicz was decided almost seven years after Schultea and,
therefore, it is somewhat misleading to call the latter a “response” to the former.
12
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factual allegations at the pleading stage: the “three-step” pleading
19
scheme.
According to the scheme, the plaintiff, in the complaint, first
20
must plead a “short and plain statement” per Rule 8(a)(2), alleging
21
a § 1983 claim against the defendant government official. Second, if
the defendant seeks to assert the affirmative defense of qualified
22
immunity, she must do so in the answer. In the third step, the court
23
directs the plaintiff to file a seldom-used Rule 7 reply that is
“tailored to the assertion of qualified immunity and fairly engages its
24
allegations.”
This Comment assesses the suitability of the three-step pleading
scheme and ultimately concludes that the scheme strikes a desirable
balance between the policies that underlie government immunity and
notice pleading. Part II provides a brief history of pleading and
procedural systems. Part III recounts the development of qualified
immunity doctrine in § 1983 actions. Part IV explores the tense
policy conflict between qualified immunity and notice pleading as
demonstrated by recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Part V,
this Comment analyzes the three-step pleading scheme presented in
Schultea, in light of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, and determines that
the Fifth Circuit has exceeded the authority conferred by the Rules.
Nevertheless, this Comment advocates the three-step scheme as a
middle-ground solution that preserves qualified immunity as a
threshold barrier against meritless litigation and helps to maintain a
Nonetheless, Schultea was a direct response to Leatherman, which was in turn
reaffirmed and arguably broadened by Swierkiewicz. Compare Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1333
(presenting the three-step scheme as the Firth Circuit’s “answer to Leatherman”), with
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 (reaffirming Leatherman).
19
See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432-33. Although Circuit Judge Higginbotham
referred to the scheme as having only two steps, the complaint and the reply, id. at
1433-34, this Comment will refer to the practice as the three-step scheme. This is
because the government defendant must file an answer (i.e., the second step)
between the complaint and reply. Id. at 1434.
20
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
21
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
22
See id. at 1433. This presumes, of course, that the defendant will plead
qualified immunity in the answer. See id. If the defendant does not do so, there
would generally be no need for a Rule 7 reply. See infra Part V.C (recommending
that the three-step scheme only be triggered “where the defense of qualified
immunity is raised in the answer”). But see infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text
(describing the uses of the reply under the current pleading regime, including
mandatory replies in response to counterclaims). Thus, when a defendant does not
assert qualified immunity, there would be no need to apply the three-step scheme at
all. See infra Part V.C.
23
FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a).
24
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
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uniform and functional pleading regime. To ensure that the practice
complies with the Court’s mandate in Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, this
25
Comment concludes by endorsing the adoption of a version of the
three-step pleading scheme. This Comment maintains, however, that
this can only be accomplished legitimately by amending the Rules
rather than by imposing the scheme through independent judicial
implementation.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF THE NOTICE PLEADING REGIME
Legal procedure in the United States has always been a moving
26
target, albeit a somewhat slow one.
Over the last four hundred
years, the trappings of traditional sources of procedure have
seemingly been shaken off in the name of reform, only to reemerge
27
as problematic but enduring features of the reformed alternatives.
During this fitful evolution, pleadings, while still required, have
28
greatly diminished in importance. Under modern civil procedure,
the pleading stage is no longer permeated by legal pitfalls and
meaningless technicalities; at the very least, the pleadings themselves
are not required to contain some “magical words,” the exclusion of
which may result in immediate and permanent disposition of the
29
lawsuit.
A liberalized pleading regime has produced estimable benefits

25
See infra notes 380-84, 388, and accompanying text (proposing a mandatory
reply to a qualified immunity assertion rather than a permissive reply under the
current Schultea scheme).
26
Although an understanding of the change from distinct common law and
equity procedural systems to various combined forms, culminating with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, is helpful to appreciate the complexities and consequences
of different pleading regimes, a truly thorough account is outside the scope of this
Comment. Instead, this Comment provides only a summary version. See infra Part II.
For a further exploration of the history of the current federal pleading regime, see
generally DAVID W. LOUSELL ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 18-29 (6th ed. 1989);
LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 6-18 (1997); Stephen B.
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1040-45 (1982);
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
27
See Subrin, supra note 26, at 931-43; see also infra Parts II.B, C, and D (discussing
how successor procedural systems have retained remnants of common law pleading).
28
See LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 28 (describing the Rules as requiring “little
more than broad and vague statements of claim and defense”).
29
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the
approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits.”); see also, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)
(providing liberal rules for amending pleadings).
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30

for the American legal system. Nevertheless, some of the discarded
and discredited practices of the previous era—particularly an
increased role for pleadings like the reply—can perhaps again be
useful in certain instances, especially when substantive immunity
31
rights collide with countervailing modern procedural devices.
Understanding how the Schultea three-step pleading scheme can
alleviate the tension between qualified immunity and notice
32
pleading requires a brief review of the history of pleading and
procedure in the United States.
A. Common Law Pleading and Procedure
Prior to the adoption of the Rules, the early American legal
system was largely dominated by the procedural system inherited
33
from English common law. Suits at law shared three main features:
34
the writ system, the use of juries, and technical pleading. Initiating
a lawsuit required obtaining the issuance of an administrative order,
35
or writ. Each writ attempted to integrate substance, procedure, and
remedy into a single form; the particular writ chosen by the aggrieved
party determined the single claim brought before the court, the
method by which the case was heard, and the available relief should
36
that party prevail. By selecting a writ, the plaintiff was required to
30
See Stephen N. Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 73 JUDICATURE 4, 4-6 (1989) (recounting scholars’ statements in support of
the Rules and providing examples of scenarios where procedural liberalization has
improved the litigation process).
31
See infra Parts IV and V; see also Robert L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 463-64 (1986)
(asserting that additional pleading of facts may help dispose of meritless civil rights
claims at an early point); Subrin, supra note 26, at 992-94, 1000-02 (highlighting
criticism of the Rules’ “overworked” procedural flexibility and reminding the legal
community that “there is another rich tradition [common law] to draw upon” for
refining civil procedure).
32
See infra Part V (explaining the three-step scheme’s potential role in resolving
issues of qualified immunity that arise in a notice pleading regime).
33
See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 26, at 926-28.
34
Id. at 914; see also LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 22-24 (providing an overview
of the features of common law procedures); S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 60-81 (2d ed. 1981) (same).
35
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 22.
36
See id. at 19-20; STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 387-88 (5th ed. 2000);
Subrin, supra note 26, at 914-18, 929. In addition to rigidly fixing substance and
remedy to a given procedure, every writ had a different procedure. LOUSELL ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 20. The variation in procedure existed for many reasons, including
the diverse sources of writs and the historical period when a writ emerged. Id.
Accordingly, the common law writ system and its enduring legacy in the English and
American legal systems have been characterized in part as “the result of a historical
accident.” TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 6. For a further exploration of various
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make a claim that fit within that writ’s subject matter and could not
37
bring another claim under another writ.
After the writ had been issued, the parties exchanged a series of
38
pleadings in an attempt to refine the suit to a single issue. The
pleadings were intended to ferret out the facts to determine whether,
if true, they would allow the pleader to recover and whether there
39
were any facts in dispute. In a typical action, the plaintiff would first
submit a “declaration”: a factually detailed account of the
40
circumstances underlying the writ. The plaintiff’s declaration could
not, at this point, deviate from the writ; alternative and cumulative
41
claims or “counts” were not permitted. Next, the defendant might
have responded with a “general demurrer,” which admitted all of the
42
plaintiff’s factual allegations and challenged a point of law. Or the
defendant could have filed a “traverse,” forgoing a challenge of the
43
law and instead denying a fact (but then only one fact).
If the
defendant chose either to demur or to traverse, the suit was
44
effectively reduced to a single issue of law or fact, respectively.
Instead, however, the defendant could have issued a plea in
“confession and avoidance,” admitting the allegations contained in a
prior pleading in an attempt to avoid the legal consequences of those
45
allegations by introducing “new matter.” By pleading in confession
and avoidance, the defendant did not reduce the suit to a single
46
issue; the plaintiff, therefore, was required to respond. In response,
the plaintiff could either demur to the defendant’s new matter
47
(raising a single legal issue) or file a “replication.” The plaintiff’s
replication either traversed one of the defendant’s facts (raising a
single fact issue) or acted as a confession and avoidance itself,

writs, their historical origins, and reasons for selecting a particular writ, see id. at 6-9.
37
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 22.
38
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 10-11.
39
Subrin, supra note 26, at 916.
40
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 10. In early English common law,
declarations were oral. Id. Over time, for convenience and other reasons, oral
declarations were replaced by written pleadings. Id.
41
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 22.
42
The modern analog to a demurrer is typically known as a motion to dismiss,
though some court systems retain the old moniker. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26,
at 11.
43
Id. at 10. The traverse is analogous to a simple denial. Id. at 11.
44
Id. at 10.
45
Id. The modern equivalent of entering a plea in confession and avoidance is
pleading an affirmative defense. Id. at 11.
46
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 10.
47
Id.
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admitting the defendant’s allegations and again raising a new
48
matter. If the replication raised a new matter of confession and
avoidance, the defendant was obligated either to respond with a
demurrer (again, reducing the suit to single legal issue) or to file a
“rejoinder,” which operated like a replication by either traversing a
fact (isolating a single fact issue) or raising another new matter of
49
confession and avoidance.
This continued until the lawsuit was
50
refined to a single issue.
As this brief example demonstrates, common law pleading often
51
became dizzyingly complex. Attempting to reach a single issue in
order to secure easier adjudication, the pleading rules instead
created a morass where a false step could easily cost a party the case
52
for entirely technical reasons. Additional restrictions were imposed
on lawsuits to keep them relatively simple; parties, for example, were
deemed so inherently conflicted that they were generally not
53
permitted to testify.
Common law also restricted the joinder of
54
parties, an offshoot of the single issue rule for claims. Historian
Frederic W. Maitland characterized the writ system by stating that
55
“discretion is entirely excluded; all is to be fixed by iron rules.”
Dissatisfaction with the harshness of common law procedure grew in
56
the United States, and popular reform movements sprung up with
57
the goal of disentangling procedure from substance.

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id. This portion of the Comment borrows a great deal from an excellent
sample pleading exchange provided by Professors Teply and Whitten. See id. at 1011.
51
Subrin, supra note 26, at 917.
52
Id. Although the convoluted English writ system was never imported wholesale
into American procedure, early informal colonial practices did eventually give way to
a greater prevalence of English procedural rules and forms. Id. at 927.
53
See id. at 919.
54
See id.
55
FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW:
TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 298 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1920).
56
Subrin, supra note 26, at 929-31. Reformers “complained that the common
law, and methods designed to circumvent that law, had resulted in a system that
obscured facts and legal issues, rather than distilling and clarifying them.” Id. at 93233.
57
Id. Among the factors that provided pressure to integrate law and equity
during the nineteenth century, Professor Subrin cites separation of powers issues
that arose as legislators (at the expense of common law judges) became more
involved with the process of law-making, the advent of the law school model over the
apprenticeship model for the instruction of law, and issues of federalism that
emerged after the establishment of a separate federal court system. Id. at 929-31.
49
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B. Equity Pleading and Procedure
Equity courts, with their own procedure, jurisdiction, substantive
field, and remedies, developed distinctly but in parallel to common
58
law courts. Although equity never took hold in early American legal
59
history as strongly as it did in England, it was nevertheless imported
60
into most American states. Typically, law judges were allowed to
61
hear special cases in equity or, as in England, the state created an
equity court system entirely distinct from the common law court
62
system.
63
From the outset, equity contrasted starkly with common law.
Because equity emerged as an alternative to common law, petitioners
sought the intervention of the King’s Council (and later specifically
the Chancellor) when the rigid common law writ system appeared to
64
offer inadequate or nonexistent relief. Consequently, equity, unlike
common law, was not fixated on pinning down and resolving a single
issue between only two parties; rather, equitable actions encompassed
65
multiple issues and parties. Additionally, the Chancellor had the
authority to fashion specific remedies rather than simply award the
66
ordinary legal remedy, monetary damages. Court orders in equity
frequently involved affirmative commands compelling the losing
party to right past wrongs (and prevent future ones) by performing
58
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 24-25; Subrin, supra note 26, at 918-19.
Pinpointing precisely when, in English history, equity established a distinct court
system has confounded historians and legal scholars. See MILSOM, supra note 34, at 82
(“Few beginnings are so elusive as that of the chancellor’s equitable jurisdiction . . .
.”). Records, though disjointed and incomplete, nevertheless suggest that equity
courts may have been distinct from law courts as early as the fourteenth century. See
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 12 (“[Equity] was recognized as a separate court
in about the middle of the fourteenth century.”).
59
See LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 26; see also Subrin, supra note 26, at 926
(reporting that “many colonists distrusted separate equity courts . . . [because equity]
represented uncontrolled discretion and needless expense and delay”).
60
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 14.
61
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 26; Subrin, supra note 26, at 928.
62
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 26; Subrin, supra note 26, at 928.
Pennsylvania, for example, did not establish equity courts until after 1800. LOUSELL
ET AL., supra note 26, at 26. In New York, state trial courts simply assumed the dual
powers of equity and common law. Id.
63
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 24-25.
64
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 12; see also 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 3 (2003)
(“[T]he primary character of equity . . . [is] that it seeks to reach and do complete
justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power
to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to
do.”).
65
Subrin, supra note 26, at 919-20.
66
Id. at 919.
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67

or not performing specific acts.
68
Equity actions, like lawsuits, involved pleadings. A petitioner
69
initiated an action in equity by filing a “petition” or bill.
The
70
If further
defendant was then required to submit an “answer.”
pleadings were needed to clarify the parties’ positions, the plaintiff
would file a rejoinder to which the defendant would respond with a
71
replication. Although superficially similar to the writ system, equity
72
pleading was not nearly so rigidly formulaic.
The petition, for
instance, needed not contain the specific facts that, if true, would
satisfy an ill-fitting cause of action that existed under a writ; rather,
the petition often contained more background information,
73
including details of the petitioner’s sympathetic circumstances. The
petitioner included this background information in an attempt to
convince the Chancellor that leaving the petitioner to an unforgiving
74
common law system would result in an injustice.
Pleadings, however, were not equity’s predominant mode of
75
winnowing issues before trial.
Rather, the Chancellor had the
power to compel (with “subpoenas” and “interrogatories”) either
party to appear and respond under oath to every allegation contained
76
in the other party’s pleadings. Additionally, the Chancellor could
compel either party to answer other specific questions put forward by
77
the other party or the Chancellor himself. Equity did not permit
testimony in open court, but rather parties provided documentary
78
The power to ask specific questions—and to receive
answers.
compelled answers—allowed the questioning party (typically the
79
plaintiff) to obtain admissions of fact that at law were unavailable.
67

Id.
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. But cf. Subrin, supra note 26, at 921 (questioning the purported distinctions
between equity and legal procedure and noting that “equity often developed its own
formal rules of both substance and process”).
73
Subrin, supra note 26, at 919.
74
See id.
75
See LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25.
76
Subrin, supra note 26, at 919.
77
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25; Subrin, supra note 26, at 919. Professor
Subrin identifies these compelled documentary answers as “the precursor to modern
pretrial discovery.” Id. The process usually focused on the defendant, whose
“conscience” was searched. Id.; LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25. This led to
equity courts being labeled “courts of conscience.” Id.
78
Subrin, supra note 26, at 919.
79
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25.
68
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This dynamic allowed equity to develop substantive doctrines
80
that were foreign to common law. Claims of fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty, for example, would be difficult if not impossible to
prove if, as in suits at law, the plaintiff could neither testify on her
81
own behalf nor compel the defendant to answer direct questions.
The Chancellor’s power to craft remedies that compelled further
action or inaction first enabled and then enhanced the creation of
82
these new doctrines.
There would be no satisfactory method of
enforcing a trust, for example, if equity could not issue orders
83
requiring “specific performance.”
Equity, despite its flexibility and goal of justice, was not without
its critics; overwhelmingly, equity cases were exceptionally costly,
84
slow, and unwieldy. The general exclusion of juries as fact-finders
caused concern that too much discretion (and the potential for
abuses of that discretion) resided in the Chancellor (and later in law
85
judges sitting in equity). Notwithstanding these enduring criticisms,
principles of substantive and procedural equity would nonetheless
86
influence the reform movements that followed.
C. Code Pleading and Procedure
In an attempt to blend law and equity into a unified and
standardized procedural system, reformers developed code pleading
87
systems as replacements for American common law procedure.
88
Most notable among these was the Field Code (the “Code).

80

Id.
Id.; see also MILSOM, supra note 34, at 85-86 (describing how the difficulties of
bringing claims such as the “tort of deceit” in common law courts were alleviated by
equity).
82
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 25.
83
Subrin, supra note 26, at 919.
84
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 47-48 (1972); see also
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 26 (stating that by the nineteenth century equity
“suits took decades or more to reach finality”); Subrin, supra note 26, at 937
(“[C]omplaints about the expense, delay, and unwieldiness of equity cases were
legion.”). In addition to the inherent demands on time and resources that larger
and more complex suits imposed, Professor Subrin also assigns blame for the often
inexorable delay on the Chancellor “who resolved—often in a most leisurely
manner—issues of both law and fact.” Id. at 920.
85
See Subrin, supra note 26, at 926-27, 928.
86
See id. at 956.
87
Subrin, supra note 26, at 931.
88
Developed primarily by (and named after) David Dudley Field, the Field Code
was adopted by New York in 1848. Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal
Rules, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1955). The Code was eventually adopted in
around half of the states, covering more than half of the United States population.
81
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Codification, however, produced mixed results at best. The Code,
for example, incorporated many features of equity by eliminating the
writ system in favor of a single mode of procedure for all legal and
90
equitable actions and by liberalizing the choice of remedy.
The
Code reduced pleadings to the “complaint,” the “answer,” and the
“reply,” reformed the rules of party and claim joinder, and made
91
amending pleadings easier. But the Code also differed from equity
in important ways: discovery devices were severely limited and juries
92
were given prominent roles. Significantly, the Code also eliminated
93
In general, flexibility and discretion, the
directed verdicts.
hallmarks of equity, were in large part removed from the province of
94
the judge.
Although reducing the pleadings in number, the Code laid the
95
groundwork for renewed technical pleading.
A complaint was
96
required to contain “facts constituting the cause of action.” David
Dudley Field, the principal architect of the Code, regarded “facts” or
97
“ultimate facts” as the objective, determinable truth; pleadings,
98
therefore, were not to contain “evidence” or “conclusions.” These
terms, however, were hardly clear to litigants, lawyers, and jurists;
much time and energy was spent not only trying to distinguish facts
from evidence and conclusions but also trying to simply agree on the
99
definition of the terms themselves.
The term “cause of action”
100
likewise suffered from definitional problems.
Derived from and

LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 27; Subrin, supra note 26, at 932, 939.
89
See Subrin, supra note 26, at 931-39.
90
LOUSELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 27.
91
Id.
92
Subrin, supra note 26, at 934.
93
Id. at 937.
94
Id. at 934, 937. Field and other codification proponents believed that “to say
that law is expansive, elastic, or accommodating, is as much to say that it is no law at
all.” DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPLETED CIVIL CODE (1865),
reprinted in SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
323, 330-31 (A. Sprague ed., 1884), quoted in Subrin, supra note 26, at 934.
95
Subrin, supra note 26, at 939-40.
96
Id. at 935.
97
Id.
98
5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1218 (1990).
99
Id.; Subrin, supra note 26, at 941. Professors Wright & Miller explain that “it
was difficult, if not impossible, to draw meaningful and consistent distinctions among
‘evidence,’ ‘facts,’ and ‘conclusions.’ These concepts tended to merge to form a
continuum and no readily apparent dividing markers developed to separate them.”
5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 98, § 1218.
100
Subrin, supra note 26, at 935.
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evocative of the old writ system, “cause of action” implied that a
specific set of facts existed that would prompt judicial action and
101
mandate a remedy.
Ultimately, despite the goal of demystifying the litigation
process, the Code and the other codifications suffered from much
the same defects as common law: they fostered the creation of “traps
for the unwary or the inexperienced pleader and tactical advantages
for the adroit pleader that were unrelated to the merits of his
102
cause.”
Piecemeal enactment and repeated amendments in many
jurisdictions created systems every bit as arcane and complex as the
103
writ system.
One code pleading regime, bloated by inexorable
amendments, was disdainfully described as “too long, too
complicated, ‘too minute and technical, and lack[ing] elasticity and
104
adaptability.’”
If nothing else, however, the failure of the code
pleading system buttressed the subsequent reform movement that
would finally succeed in breaking American civil procedure away
105
from its common law roots.
D. Notice Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
In 1934, after years of attempted reform, Congress planted the
seeds of a radical alteration of the procedural landscape by enacting
106
the Rules Enabling Act (the “REA”).
The REA permitted the
Supreme Court “to prescribe, by general rules, for the District Courts
of the United States . . . the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and
107
motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law.” In
accordance with the REA, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory
Committee to draft new uniform procedural rules for federal
108
courts.
The Committee largely adopted the goal of Charles E.
Clark, a committee member and proponent of a less restrictive
101

Id.
5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 98, § 1218.
103
Subrin, supra note 26, at 940. The Throop Code, for example, expanded the
New York Code of Civil Procedure from an original 392 provisions to 3441 provisions
as amended. Id. In addition to sheer mass, the Throop Code was also plagued by
endemic disorganization: “unrelated matters were side by side—a ‘patent lack of
arrangement and symmetry.’” Id. at 941 (quoting President’s Address by J. Newton
Fiero (Jan. 18, 1893), reprinted in 16 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 48, 50 (1893)).
104
Id. (quoting Report of the Committee on Code Revision (1898), 22 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP.
170, 175 (1899)) (alteration in original).
105
See id. at 940.
106
Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1990)).
107
Id.
108
Subrin, supra note 26, at 970-74.
102
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American legal system, to create “a really unified procedure [that]
would not involve repudiation of the present satisfactory equity rules,
109
but merely an expansion of them to all actions.”
By successfully merging equity and common law, the Federal
110
Rules of Civil Procedure, formally adopted in 1938, dramatically
111
liberalized the early segments of litigation. The Rules represented
a remarkable change in civil practice that was manifested by three
major developments: the advent of minimal pleadings, the reliance
on liberal discovery, and the diminishment of juries in favor of judge112
controlled adjudication.
The overarching goal of the new system
was that the underlying bases of claims and defenses should be
brought to light at the discovery stage rather than primarily by the
113
pleadings. Instead of forcing a set of facts to fit imperfectly into the
unyielding cause of action prescribed by a particular writ, the
complaint needs only to contain a brief account of the incident
showing that the plaintiff has stated a claim that invokes a cognizable
114
body of law.
The Rules hold the defendant to substantially the
115
same standard in the answer.
116
however, the
Unlike common law and code pleading,
presentation of “new matter” does not automatically trigger another
117
round of responsive pleading.
Although the Rules retained the
118
reply (in Rule 7), it is mandatory only if the defendant pleads a
109
Charles E. Clark, The Charles E. Clark Papers, Sterling Memorial Library of
Yale University, Manuscripts & Archives, Box 108, Folder 40, quoted in Subrin, supra
note 26, at 971.
110
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 26, at 16.
111
Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil
Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 986 (1998).
112
Id. at 986-88.
113
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f) (mandating that “[a]ll
pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”); 2A JAMES WM. MOORE ET
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 7.01[1] (2d ed. 1996) (“The broad discovery
provisions of Rules 26 to 37, together with the pretrial conference under Rule 16,
have considerably relieved the pleadings of much of the burden of formulating
issues.”).
114
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
115
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b). Rule 8(b) requires a party to “state in short and plain
terms the party’s defenses to each claim asserted.” Id.
116
See infra Parts II.A and C (discussing common law and code pleading).
117
See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a).
118
Rule 7 is derived from the Federal Equity Rules of 1912, a liberalized but nonmerged system that served as a precursor to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2A
MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, ¶ 7.03. Equity Rule 31, upon which Rule 7 is based,
reduced mandatory responsive pleadings to the answer and a reply when the answer
contained a set-off or counterclaim. Id. Otherwise, the court retained discretion to
order a reply. Id.

2003

COMMENT

403

119

counterclaim.
Otherwise, the plaintiff can file a reply only with
120
Requiring a reply has been deemed
leave of the court.
extraordinary under modern civil procedure:
[A] reply to an affirmative defense should not be ordered unless
there is a clear and convincing factual showing of necessity or other
extraordinary circumstances of a compelling nature. . . . [A] reply
is not to be utilized as a substitute for discovery and inspection or for a
121
pre-trial hearing.

The Rules also preserved a heightened pleading standard in
limited instances: Rule 9(b) requires that “the circumstances
122
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”
Rule 9(b) complaints, therefore, must allege each element of fraud
123
or mistake.
For illustration, the Supreme Court has held that the
elements of fraud are: (1) a false representation (2) regarding a
material fact (3) made with both knowledge of its falsity (4) and an
intent to deceive (5) resulting in acts made in reasonable reliance on
124
the representation. The complaint need not contain specific facts
125
on each element or present detailed evidentiary matter.
Rather,
the “complaint must adequately specify the statements it claims were
false or misleading, give particulars as to the respect in which plaintiff
contends the statements were fraudulent, state when and where the
statements were made, and identify those responsible for the
126
statements.” Although requiring heightened pleading, Rule 9(b) is
nonetheless considered an extension of the notice pleading regime;
the goal of particularity is not to reduce the suit to a single factual or
legal issue, but rather to give notice where “slightly more is
127
needed.”
The objective of this minimal pleading requirement is to give

119

See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a) (“There shall be . . . a reply to a counterclaim
denominated as such . . . .”).
120
See id. (“No other pleading shall be allowed, except the court may order a reply
to an answer or a third-party answer.”). The plaintiff should not file a reply without
being ordered to do so by the court. 2A MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, ¶ 7.03. If the
plaintiff files voluntarily anyway, the court will ignore the unauthorized reply except
that the court may consider statements by the pleader as admissions against that
party’s interests, if applicable. Id.
121
Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 24 F.R.D. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)
(emphasis added).
122
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
123
2A MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, ¶ 9.03[2].
124
Pence v. United States, 316 U.S. 332, 338 (1942).
125
2A MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, ¶ 9.03[1].
126
Cosmas v. Hassett, 868 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989).
127
Davis & Cox v. Summa Corp., 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 281, 284 (9th Cir. 1981).
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the receiving party “notice” of the pleader’s claims or defenses and
128
the grounds upon which they rest. Then, liberal discovery follows,
permitting both sides access to the litigants, witnesses, and
129
documentary and other evidence. This access in turn helps refine
the claims and defenses and clarify the factual setting from which
130
they arise.
Finally, if, after sufficient discovery, there remains no
genuine issue of material fact, the judge can forgo a costly and timeconsuming trial by rendering summary judgment where it is
131
appropriate.
Many legal scholars consider notice pleading to have been a
132
huge success.
If nothing else, it has finally achieved the most
thorough disengagement of procedure and substance and the most
133
stable merger of law and equity. Having been adopted wholesale by
the federal court system and in large parts by most of the states,
liberalized civil procedure based on the Rules has accumulated
intellectual and judicial inertia; it is the American procedural
134
system.
It is in this context that recent developments in qualified
immunity doctrine have emerged. Before reviewing case law where
notice pleading and qualified immunity came into direct conflict,
tracing the sources and examining the contours of prior qualified
immunity jurisprudence is required.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN § 1983 CASES
Section 1983, on its face, creates liability for any person who acts
under state authority to deprive a citizen of rights guaranteed under
135
federal law or the United States Constitution.
Nowhere does the
128

Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (defining the broad scope of discovery by
providing that “parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence,
description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons”); FED. R. CIV. P. 37
(providing for sanctions the court may impose against parties failing to comply with
discovery orders).
130
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
131
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). But cf. Molot, supra note 111, at 988 (arguing that
summary judgment has proven to be an inadequate device to reduce the number of
cases from going to trial).
132
See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 30, at 4 (“The Federal Rules . . . have been a major
triumph of law reform.”).
133
Id. at 5 (“The Federal Rules have not just survived; they have influenced
procedural thinking in every court in the land (and some in other lands) . . . .”).
134
Id. (“[The Rules] have indeed become part of the consciousness of lawyers,
judges, and scholars who worry about and live with issues of judicial procedure.”).
135
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
129
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statute mention an immunity defense for government officials.
137
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, section 1 of which was codified
at § 1983, was originally enacted primarily to target state
138
governmental officials and agencies specifically.
Despite this
distrust of state governments that underlies § 1983, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that immunity of some type is available for
139
every government official’s discretionary actions.
A. A Doctrinal Shift Toward Cost Avoidance and Early Disposition

The policies behind official immunity appear relatively
straightforward. Because government officials often have to do the
“dirty work” of public service, the Court recognized that it would be
an “injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, [to subject] to
liability an official who is required by the legal obligations of his
140
position, to exercise discretion.”
The Court was also reluctant to
allow the threat of § 1983 actions to deter officials from exercising
141
that discretion.
Significantly, the justification for official immunity has shifted
away from concerns about unfairness to officials and overdeterrence
of official discretion to instead focus on the costs § 1983 actions
impose on governments and government officials and, therefore, on
142
society. These social costs include the actual monetary expenses of
defending against such lawsuits, the potential distraction of officials
136

See id.
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1996)).
138
See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961) (stating that the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was in response to apprehension that “the claims of citizens
to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2, at 453-55 (3d ed. 1999) (providing a brief history of §
1983). Some commentators have insisted that the Court has either misinterpreted or
ignored the legislative history of § 1983. See, e.g., David Achtenberg, Immunity Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 497 (1992) (contending that the Court’s recent qualified immunity decisions
have created an unstable doctrine that does not reflect Congress’ intent); Gene R.
Nichol, Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REV. 959 (1987) (discussing
the Supreme Court’s erratic account of the history of § 1983).
139
E.g., Schuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 202, 240 (1974).
140
Id.
141
Id.; see also PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR
OFFICIAL WRONGS 60-77 (1983) (arguing that personal liability for officials will lead to
harmfully timid behavior).
142
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For a description of this
doctrinal shift, see Alan K. Chen, The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment
and the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 15-20 (1997).
137

406

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:389

from their governmental duties, and the deterrence of individuals
143
The Court has determined
from even serving as public officials.
that these costs are likely to be substantial, especially in light of the
144
presumption that the majority of § 1983 claims are meritless. Mere
limitations on liability, therefore, are insufficient to further this policy
145
of cost prevention.
Consequently, the avoidance of social costs
achieved by the early disposal of claims has become the main thrust
146
of the policy for official immunity.
The Court’s focus on cost avoidance, rather than on unfairness
or overdeterrence from action, represents a crucial turning point in
147
the development of qualified immunity.
Arguably, an immunity
defense that shields officials from liability, rather than entirely from
suit, can adequately placate the fairness and overdeterrence
148
concerns. Indeed, it is hardly unfair if the lawsuit does not result in
149
Similarly, it is
liability where there rightly should be none.
uncertain at best that officials would be overly deterred by the mere
threat of suit if they knew that they would not ultimately face
150
staggering damage awards.
But, if the imperative is to avoid
litigation expenses and their collateral social impact completely,
rather than merely to avert an adverse judgment, then qualified
immunity becomes much more than freedom from liability or even
freedom from trial; instead, as the Court has repeatedly held,
151
qualified immunity requires total immunity from suit.
This fixation
on cost avoidance and early disposition has forced courts to navigate
the complicated interrelationship between qualified immunity and
152
notice pleading.
B. Immunity Analysis Reexamined in Light of the Doctrinal Shift
The Court has carved two official immunity defenses out of §

143

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
Id. But cf. Chen, supra note 142, at 19 n.92 (disputing the Court’s assumption
that § 1983 claims are often meritless).
145
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
146
See id.; Chen, supra note 142, at 15-20.
147
See Chen, supra note 142, at 21.
148
Id. at 22.
149
Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 652-53 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
150
Id. at 25.
151
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
152
See infra Part IV (recounting the Supreme Court’s recent qualified immunity
jurisprudence).
144
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1983: absolute immunity and qualified immunity.
In determining
which immunity applies to a given government official, the court
looks to the “immunity historically accorded the relevant official at
154
common law and the interests behind it.”
Absolute immunity is
available to a relatively small number of positions held by government
officials and only when those officials perform a few prescribed
155
functions. Judges, for example, are protected by absolute immunity
156
for conduct within the scope of their judicial authority. In contrast,
judges are not absolutely immune for actions pursuant to their
administrative or executive authority; they are, however, still
157
accorded qualified immunity for those actions.
Qualified immunity is generally available to those officials whose
158
discretionary official actions are not absolutely immune.
Initially,
153
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. Absolute immunity, by definition, provides a complete
exemption from suit for certain types of specified conduct. See Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). In contrast, qualified immunity only precludes
litigation if a certain set of conditions is present; in the § 1983 context, an official is
entitled to qualified immunity for her discretionary actions unless she violates a
citizen’s federal or constitutional rights which were clearly established at the time of
the violation. See infra note 167 and accompanying text; see also Susan Zinn & Javier
Maldonado, Civil Rights, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 481, 488-89 (2000) (summarizing
immunity defenses available to government defendants).
154
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421. The Court has consistently reaffirmed the common law
approach to deciding questions of immunity. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 594-95 (1998); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997); City of Newport
v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981). For a summary of the common law
approach and some frequent criticisms of it, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, §
8.6.1, at 494-97.
155
See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (advising courts to assess the
“nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 8.6.2, at 500 (“In applying absolute immunity . . . the
focus is on the function performed, rather than the title possessed.”).
156
See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967). In addition, members of Congress and their aides are absolutely immune for
their legislative functions. See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491
(1975) (holding that legislative immunity is derived from the Speech and Debate
Clause of Article I of the Constitution). State and local legislators, when acting in
their legislative capacity, receive an analogous absolute immunity protection derived
from common law. Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980). A
prosecutor’s conduct during an actual prosecution (rather than, say, an
investigation) is shielded by absolute immunity. See, e.g., Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511; Imbler,
424 U.S. 409. Police officials are absolutely immune for testimony they give as
witnesses. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). Finally, the president of the
United States is absolutely immune from monetary liability for conduct performed
“while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office.” Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
731, 749 (1982). For a further discussion of the nuances of absolute immunity, see
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 8.6.2, at 500-12.
157
See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228, 230.
158
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806-07; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273
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159

in Schuer v. Rhodes, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could
overcome qualified immunity by showing that either: (1) the official
had no reasonable grounds to believe her conduct comported with
the law (the objective prong); or (2) that the official subjectively did
not have a good faith belief that her conduct was lawful (the
160
subjective prong).
The subjective prong could be fulfilled if the
official was motivated by bad faith to deprive the victim of
161
constitutional or statutory rights. Satisfying either prong, however,
merely allowed the plaintiff to defeat qualified immunity; proof at
trial (or sufficient for the plaintiff to prevail at summary judgment) of
an actual constitutional or statutory violation that caused the
162
plaintiff’s alleged damages was still required for recovery.
Due to the policy shift to cost avoidance, Schuer’s alternative
163
objective/subjective test was replaced in Harlow v. Fitzgerald to more
164
In Harlow, A. Ernest
easily achieve early disposition of suits.
Fitzgerald, an Air Force analyst, lost his job in a department
165
reorganization.
Fitzgerald sued two presidential aides, among
others, claiming that his dismissal was in retaliation for his testimony
before the Senate a year earlier, where he revealed $2 billion in
defense department cost overruns, and that the dismissal violated his
166
constitutional and statutory rights.
Determining that absolute
immunity did not protect the aides, the Supreme Court held that
officials performing discretionary functions are generally qualifiedly
immune “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
167
known.”
(1993) (stating that qualified immunity “represents the norm” for executive officials
(internal quotation omitted)); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Wrongs Without
Remedies: Executive Official Immunity, 62 WASH U. L.Q. 221, 221 (1984) (stating that
qualified immunity is available to the majority of executive officials).
159
416 U.S. 232 (1974).
160
See id. at 247-48.
161
Wood v. Stickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, §
8.6.3, at 514.
162
See Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22.
163
457 U.S. 800 (1982).
164
Id. at 815-16.
165
Nixon, 457 U.S. at 734-35, 739. Because Nixon is the companion case to Harlow,
the underlying facts were the same in both cases and the Court recited them in detail
in Nixon only. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 802. Unlike the defendants in Harlow, however,
the President received absolute immunity for his actions in office. Compare Harlow,
457 U.S. at 802-03, with Nixon, 457 U.S. at 747. See also supra note 156 (including
presidential immunity among the available absolute immunity defenses).
166
Nixon, 457 U.S. at 734.
167
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added).
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In one fell swoop, Harlow eliminated the subjective “good faith”
168
prong available under the Schuer test. Because the inquiry into the
subjective motive of an official almost invariably involved a fact
169
dispute that Rule 56 summary judgment ordinarily could not
resolve, the Court acknowledged that many courts were therefore
170
unable to dispose of such claims early on using summary judgment.
The Court concluded that the subjective test was “incompatible with
our admonition . . . that insubstantial claims should not proceed to
171
trial.”
The Court refused to allow a litigant to impose the social
costs of § 1983 litigation, including the “burdens of broad-reaching
172
173
The
discovery,” by bringing forth “bare allegations of malice.”
doctrinal shift toward cost avoidance had clearly tipped the balance
174
away from the protection of individual citizens’ rights. Essentially,
the removal of the subjective prong means that an official can
conduct herself with bad faith or malice, even egregiously so, as long
as she does not violate a clearly established constitutional or federal
175
right.
Since Harlow, the Court has steadily rendered pro-defendant
decisions that have further strengthened the qualified immunity
176
defense for government officials. For example, a plaintiff may not
168

Id. at 817-18.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Rule 56 authorizes the court to render summary
judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Id.
170
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
171
Id. at 815-16 (internal citation omitted).
172
Id. at 818.
173
Id. at 817.
174
See id. at 816.
175
PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 871 (2d ed. 1983) (arguing that by removing the subjective
prong, the effect of Harlow “may be to allow an unscrupulous official to engage in
malicious misuse of public authority whenever the relevant legal standards are
objectively unclear”).
176
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 8.6.3, at 521. The Court’s pro-defendant
jurisprudence has come under heavy criticism. See, e.g., id. (“Although a strong case
can be made for protecting officers, it is troubling to do so unless liability of
governmental entities is correspondingly expanded.”); Chen, supra note 142, at 99
(characterizing the litigation battles between plaintiffs and defendants over qualified
immunity as “an elaborate sideshow . . . that in many cases will do little to advance or
accelerate resolution of the legal claims”); Achtenberg, supra note 138, at 549
(positing that the current qualified immunity doctrine is too broad and reflects “the
will of the current Court” rather than “the will of the enacting Congress”). Whatever
merit these and other criticisms of the Court’s conception of qualified immunity may
have, this Comment’s main focus is not to justify or discredit the Court’s policy
169
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rely on state law to ascertain whether a federal or constitutional right
was clearly established at the time of the official’s conduct, even
though the state right may be analogous to, or even derived from, a
177
federal statute or the Constitution.
In addition, when examining
the reasonableness of an official’s conduct, the Court has fallen short
of demanding exact factual identity but nonetheless has required that
178
the conduct be considered at a rather low level of generality.
Indeed, the Court has focused quite narrowly on the specific conduct
of the official when asking whether a “reasonable official would
179
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Finally, the
Court has held that determinations of qualified immunity are usually
questions of law that are immediately appealable in order to better
180
protect defendants’ immunity from suit. All of these decisions have
reinforced the goal of limiting or eliminating the social costs of
allowing the discovery and trial stages of litigation to proceed against
181
government officials facing meritless § 1983 claims.
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY CONVERGES ON NOTICE PLEADING—THE
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE MEETS THE IMMOVABLE OBJECT
Given the potential for tension between a notice pleading
system, whose default position allows for relatively easy access to
courts and liberal discovery, and an immunity doctrine that
encourages the speedy resolution of claims, it is not surprising that
many lower courts have relied on judicial innovations such as
182
independently created heightened pleading standards.
By

determinations; rather, this Comment seeks to reconcile, to the extent possible, the
conflicting policies behind qualified immunity and notice pleading. See infra Parts IV
and V. Thus, this Comment’s final conclusion that the three-step scheme should be
implemented is not intended to be a value-driven recommendation; instead, it is
merely a reasoned compromise solution to a vexing divergence of policies. See infra
Parts V.A, B, and C.
177
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194-96 (1984). But see id. at 193 n.11 (stating
that “[s]tate law may bear upon a claim under the Due Process Clause when the
property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are created by state
law”).
178
See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
179
Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
180
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-30. For a more detailed account of when and why
denials of qualified immunity are immediately appealable, see Kathryn R. Urbonya,
Interlocutory Appeals from Orders Denying Qualified Immunity: Determining the Proper Scope
of Appellate Jurisdiction, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (1998).
181
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, § 8.6.3, at 521.
182
See infra Parts IV.A, B, and C; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 589
(1998) (holding that lower courts cannot impose a heightened evidentiary standard
on § 1983 claims); Chen, supra note 142, at 74 (“Once the Supreme Court
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requiring that the complaint be particularized, some courts have
183
The Supreme Court, however, has
admittedly weeded out claims.
consistently demonstrated that it is even more reluctant to act
contrary to the Rules than it is zealous in protecting qualified
184
immunity.
A. Establishing the Defendant’s Pleading Burden and Setting the Stage
for the Fight to Come
185

In Gomez v. Toledo,
the Court established that qualified
immunity is an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise in
186
the answer. In Gomez, police agent Carlos Gomez brought a § 1983
action against the police superintendent, claiming a violation of his
187
procedural due process rights.
Gomez alleged that he had been
discharged for testifying in a criminal proceeding about misconduct
188
committed by other officers. The district court dismissed the claim,
concluding that because the superintendent was entitled to qualified
189
immunity for discretionary official actions carried out in good faith,
190
the plaintiff failed to state a claim by not alleging bad faith.
The
191
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff in a §
1983 case must allege merely that some person deprived her of a
federal right and that the person was acting under the color of state
192
law.
Furthermore, the Court found that the plaintiff is under no
obligation to anticipate the defense of qualified immunity by
193
Rather, the
pleading that the official was motivated by bad faith.
Court pointed out, the Rules place the burden squarely on the

acknowledged . . . that discovery would be necessary to adjudicate some qualified
immunity claims, it laid the groundwork for substantial confusion among the lower
courts.”).
183
See, e.g., GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.
1998); Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992).
184
For an exploration of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, see infra Parts IV.C and D.
185
446 U.S. 635 (1980).
186
Id. at 640-41.
187
Id. at 636.
188
Id. at 637.
189
At the time of Gomez, the inquiry into qualified immunity was governed by the
subjective/objective Schuer test. Gomez, 446 U.S. at 641. The subjective “good faith”
portion was eliminated in Harlow, two years after Gomez was decided. See Harlow, 457
U.S. at 818; supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
190
Gomez, 446 U.S. at 637-38.
191
Id. at 638.
192
Id. at 640.
193
Id.
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defendant to plead any “matter constituting an avoidance or
194
affirmative defense.”
Although Gomez did not address the imposition of a particularity
requirement, the Court recognized the fundamental incongruity of
requiring the plaintiff to respond in advance to a legal argument that
195
had not yet been presented. In a notice pleading regime, a plaintiff
can hardly be expected to anticipate a response to a claim of which
196
the defendant has not been given notice. Later holdings that dealt
specifically with a judicially imposed heightened pleading standard in
197
the complaint would echo this untenable premise.
B. Clarifying the Plaintiff’s Pleading Burden
198

In Siegert v. Gilley, the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity
to determine the propriety of a heightened pleading standard in
199
qualified immunity cases.
Instead, the Court sidestepped the
heightened pleading issue, concluding that the complaint in Siegert
failed to satisfy even the minimal pleading burden established in
200
Gomez.
In Siegert, plaintiff Frederick Siegert, a clinical psychiatrist
201
employed by the federal government, initiated a Bivens action
against his former supervisor for writing an allegedly defamatory
202
recommendation letter.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that his
supervisor’s letter was motivated by bad faith in contravention of his
203
Fifth Amendment “liberty interests.”
The defendant moved to dismiss and alternatively for summary
judgment, maintaining that Siegert’s factual allegations did not
204
amount to the violation of any constitutional right. The defendant
further contended that, in any event, he was protected by qualified
205
immunity.
The district court denied the motions and instead

194

Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)).
See id.
196
See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 640-41.
197
See infra Parts IV.C and D (discussing Leatherman and Swierkiewicz).
198
500 U.S. 226.
199
Id. at 231.
200
Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 192-94 (describing the minimal
allegations required under Gomez).
201
For the purposes of this Comment, Bivens actions raise the identical pleading
and qualified immunity issues as § 1983 actions. See supra note 2 (discussing Bivens
actions).
202
Siegert, 500 U.S. at 228-29.
203
Id. at 229.
204
Id.
205
Id.
195
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206

ordered limited discovery. When the defendant requested a stay of
discovery pending determination of his assertion of qualified
immunity, the court responded that Siegert’s allegations constituted
207
a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.
Therefore,
208
the court found qualified immunity inapplicable.
The defendant
209
immediately appealed the denial of qualified immunity.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and
210
remanded, ordering the lower court to dismiss.
First, the court
determined that, absent malice by the supervisor, the alleged conduct
211
Furthermore, to the
did not infringe on a constitutional right.
extent that improper motive was an element of the defamation claim,
the court held that the plaintiff failed to plead with sufficient
212
particularity to overcome the qualified immunity defense.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Supreme
Court, ultimately affirmed the court of appeals’ dismissal, but not
because Siegert had failed to support his allegation of malice by
213
pleading specific facts. Rather, the Court pointed out that Siegert’s
allegations failed at an even earlier juncture because they did not
214
state a claim of a constitutional violation.
The Court determined
that while his allegations may have satisfied state law defamation
claims, freedom from injury to reputation was not, by itself, a
215
constitutional right.
The Court instructed that before even
considering whether the alleged right was “clearly established,” and
thereby implicating the qualified immunity defense, the lower court
should have first determined whether the government official
216
violated a constitutional right at all.
The Chief Justice explained that such a “purely legal question
permits courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test
without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity
to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend
206

Id. at 229-30.
Id. at 230.
208
Siegert, 500 U.S. at 230.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 230-31.
213
Id. at 232.
214
Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231.
215
Id. at 232; see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 (1976) (asserting that
there is “no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by a public official
into a deprivation of [a constitutional right]” and concluding that reputation by itself
is not protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments).
216
Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.
207
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217

the suit on its merits.”
The Court indicated that the court of
appeals incorrectly assumed that Siegert had indeed alleged a
constitutional violation and, therefore, improperly reached the
218
merits of the qualified immunity defense.
Although the D.C.
Circuit was ultimately correct in dismissing the suit, the Court
concluded that the manner in which the circuit reached that result
219
deviated from the policy of cost avoidance. According to the Court,
by haphazardly presupposing a constitutional violation, the circuit
failed to make the thorough threshold determination that would
220
have halted the suit and avoided the costs that followed.
In
confining its holding to the initial determination of the existence of a
constitutional right, the Court avoided addressing the court of
221
appeals’ imposition of a heightened pleading standard.
Justice Kennedy, however, in a concurrence, found merit in the
use of a heightened pleading standard to dispose of § 1983 cases
where, as in defamation, the subjective intent of the defendant is an
222
element of the claim.
Justice Kennedy recognized “the tension
between [Harlow’s objective test] and the requirement of malice,” and
opined that “the heightened pleading standard is the most workable
223
means to resolve it.”
Although the concurrence conceded that
requiring a particularized complaint in § 1983 cases is not prescribed
by the Rules, Justice Kennedy argued that protecting the substantive
defense of qualified immunity demanded a departure from the
224
normal pleading and summary judgment rules.
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy’s recommended practice bears a
225
striking resemblance to the practice devised in Schultea.
After the
plaintiff asserts that a constitutional or statutory right has been
violated and the defendant responds by pleading qualified immunity,
the Justice explained, “the plaintiff must put forward specific,
217

Id.
Id.
219
Id.; see also supra Parts III.A and B (discussing the doctrinal shift to cost
avoidance as the leading policy justification for qualified immunity).
220
Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232.
221
See id. at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222
Id. at 235-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223
Id.
224
Id. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A]voidance of disruptive discovery is
one of the very purposes for the official immunity doctrine, and it is no answer to say
that the plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to engage in discovery. The
substantive defense of immunity controls.”).
225
Compare Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring), with Schultea, 47 F.3d
at 1433 (citing Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as support for the three-step pleading
scheme).
218
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nonconclusory factual allegations which establish malice, or face
226
Justice Kennedy, however, conceded that his
dismissal.”
recommendation represents “a departure from the usual pleading
227
requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b).”
Nevertheless, as Justice Kennedy’s statements underscored, the very
fact that judges have felt pressured into creating heightened pleading
standards and other burdens in order to dispose of meritless § 1983
cases exposes the strain between qualified immunity and notice
228
pleading.
Eventually, a mechanism must be devised to replace, or
at least compliment, the inadequate barriers to litigation provided by
the Gomez/Siegert burden of pleading the violation of a clearly
established constitutional statutory right.
C. The Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects a Heightened Pleading
Standard . . . but Leaves a Loophole
A judicially imposed heightened pleading standard in a § 1983
action finally caught the direct attention of the Supreme Court in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
229
Unit.
In Leatherman, several homeowners alleged that local police
officers conducted illegal searches during which they assaulted one
230
homeowner and destroyed another’s property.
The homeowners
brought § 1983 actions against several officers and the county,
claiming that the alleged misconduct violated their Fourth
231
Amendment rights. Additionally, the plaintiffs contended that the
municipality should be liable for allegedly failing to properly train
232
the officers.
226

Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.; cf. infra Part V.B (demonstrating that the Schultea scheme oversteps the
judicial authority conferred by the Rules).
228
See infra Parts IV.C and D.
229
507 U.S. 163 (1993).
230
Id. at 165.
231
Id.
232
Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Oddly, whereas
individual official liability has progressively been foreclosed upon by immunity
doctrines, municipal liability has been treated much differently. Mark R. Brown,
Correlating Municipal Liability and Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 625, 631 (1989). Initially, the Court held that a municipality was not a “person”
under § 1983 and, therefore, could not be held liable for the actions of its officials.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961). Seventeen years later, in Monell, the
Court overturned Monroe and reinstated municipal liability where an official’s
injurious conduct was undertaken pursuant to the local government’s “official
policies or established customs.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 707-08. Furthermore, the Court
later held that although municipalities are not subject to respondeat superior
liability, neither are they entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 691; Owen v. City of
227
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The district court dismissed the claims, and the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, because the plaintiffs failed to meet the
233
heightened pleading standard required by Fifth Circuit precedent.
234
The plaintiffs appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Finally, a judicially imposed particularity requirement was directly
235
before the Court.
After reaffirming the premise that municipalities, unlike
236
officials, are not entitled to an immunity defense, the Court
considered the municipality’s argument that, out of necessity, the
level of specificity required under the Rules should be greater where
237
the underlying substantive law has grown more intricate.
According to the defendant, plaintiffs “must do more than plead a
single instance of misconduct” to establish municipal liability under §
238
1983. Consequently, the municipality contended, the Fifth Circuit’s
“heightened pleading standard” was mislabeled and was not actually a
239
deviation of the Rules at all.

Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980). As a result, municipalities, unlike
government officials, receive some immunity from liability rather than immunity
from suit. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 166. The Court’s handling of municipal liability
has been subject to criticism from both sides of the governmental liability debate.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 138, §§ 8.5.1, 8.5.3, at 477-78, 491. On one hand, restricting
governmental liability reduces incentives for local government to ensure that their
officials act lawfully. Id. On the other hand, if the goal of immunity is to avoid the
costs of § 1983 litigation, it does not then make logical sense to allow proceedings
against municipalities to reach discovery and trial. Id. For an exploration of the
peculiar consequences caused by the disparity between municipal and individual
liability and an argument for reform that would more closely align the two, see
generally Brown, supra.
233
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165. For a further exploration of the development of
the Fifth Circuit’s heightened pleading standard, see Rodriguez v. Avita, 871 F.2d
552 (5th Cir. 1989); Palmer v. City of San Antonio, 810 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1987);
Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985); Morrison v. City of Baton Rouge, 761
F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1985). In Morrison, the Fifth Circuit summed up its heightened
pleading standard:
[L]iberal notions of notice pleading must ultimately give way to
immunity doctrines that protect us from having the work of our public
officers chilled or disrupted. . . . [T]he complaint must allege “with
particularity all material facts on which [the claimant] contends he will
establish his right to recovery, which will include detailed facts
supporting the contention that the pleas of immunity cannot be
sustained.”
761 F.2d at 244 (quoting Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1482 (alteration in original)).
234
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 165.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 166; see also supra note 232 (describing municipal liability under § 1983).
237
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167.
238
Id.; see also supra note 232 (describing municipal liability under § 1983).
239
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167.

2003

COMMENT

417

The Court summarily rejected the municipality’s argument and
240
Chief Justice Rehnquist,
unanimously reversed the decision.
writing for the Court, recognized that “the [Fifth Circuit’s]
heightened pleading standard is just what it purports to be: a more
demanding rule for pleading a complaint under § 1983 than for
241
pleading other kinds of claims for relief.”
The Court found the
standard “impossible to square” with the prevailing notice pleading
242
regime. Although the Chief Justice acknowledged two instances, in
cases of fraud or mistake, where the Rules require a particularized
243
complaint, he also pointed out that the Rules did not contain any
provisions for a similar particularity requirement for § 1983
244
complaints against municipalities. According to the Court, explicit
authority provided in one instance necessarily implied that it was
245
excluded in others, or “[e]xpressio unius est exclusio alterius.”
Moreover, the Court suggested that were the Rules to be rewritten,
perhaps the drafters would include § 1983 claims against
municipalities among those required to be plead with particularity,
but “that is a result which must be obtained by the process of
246
amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”
In
the meantime, the Chief Justice concluded, lower federal courts
would have to rely on summary judgment and limited discovery to
247
dispose of frivolous claims.
Unfortunately, the Court expressly declined to address whether
a heightened pleading standard is appropriate where individual
248
government officials may be protected by qualified immunity. The
Court even went as far as to follow the trajectory of the Fifth Circuit’s
pleading standard, tracing its origins from § 1983 cases against
249
250
individuals to its extension over claims against municipalities.
Nevertheless, the Court purposefully fell short of applying to all cases
its prohibition against judicially imposed heightened pleading

240

Id. at 164.
Id. at 167 (internal quotations omitted).
242
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
243
Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)).
244
Id. at 168.
245
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
246
Id. (emphasis added).
247
Id. at 168-69.
248
Id. at 166-67.
249
Id. at 167 (citing Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1473); see also supra note 233 (listing Fifth
Circuit cases developing the heightened pleading standard ultimately struck down in
Leatherman).
250
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167 (citing Palmer, 810 F.2d 517).
241
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251

standards. Some courts have read the Leatherman opinion as a fairly
252
broad rejection of particularized pleadings, especially focusing on
where Chief Justice Rehnquist contrasted the authority under Rule
253
8(a)(2) to that under Rule 9(b). Many courts, however, have taken
advantage of the Leatherman loophole to prolong their own practices
of requiring a particularized complaint in § 1983 cases against
254
government individuals.
And so the intractable conflict has
remained: courts, judges, attorneys, and litigants continued to find
themselves caught between the immovable object of the notice
pleading regime and the irresistible force that is the doctrine of
qualified immunity.
D. The Final Bell Tolls for Judicially Imposed Heightened Pleading
Standards
Judge-made heightened pleading standards met their ultimate
255
demise in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.
Although not a § 1983 case,
Swierkiewicz made unmistakably clear that the Supreme Court would
no longer countenance extra-authoritative tinkering with the Rules’
256
pleading requirements.
In Swierkiewicz, the plaintiff, a Hungarian native, filed suit against
his former employer, a private reinsurance company, for allegedly
terminating him because of his nationality in violation of Title VII of
257
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and because of his age in violation of
258
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.
The district
court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff failed to allege
facts with sufficient particularity that could lead to an inference of
259
discrimination.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that the plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege
sufficient facts to make out a prima facie case of employment
260
discrimination per the circuit’s established requirement.
On
251

See id. at 166-67.
See supra note 12 (listing courts).
253
See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
254
See supra notes 12, 16 (listing courts construing Leatherman narrowly to reach
only § 1983 municipality cases).
255
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
256
See id. at 513-14.
257
Id. at 509 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994)).
258
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994)).
259
Id.
260
Id. The Second Circuit had required that, to avoid dismissal, an employment
discrimination complaint must allege: “(1) membership in a protected group; (2)
qualification for the job in question; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4)
circumstances that support an inference of discrimination.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at
252
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appeal, the Supreme Court considered the propriety of heightened
pleading standards in the employment discrimination context and,
261
ultimately, in a broader spectrum of actions.
A unanimous Supreme Court soundly rejected the Second
262
Circuit’s imposition of a specificity requirement.
First, Justice
Thomas, writing for the Court, explained that prior precedent
establishing criteria for a prima facie employment discrimination
263
claim was “an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.”
Next, the Court declared that it was never appropriate for a federal
court to go beyond the boundaries of the Rules when crafting
264
pleading requirements.
The Court reasserted that federal courts
are subject to the notice pleading regime; admittedly, the Court
noted, the Rules have a few special exceptions where particularity in
the complaint is required, namely Rule 9(b) actions for fraud or
265
Justice
mistake, but those exceptions are explicitly authorized.
Thomas emphasized that, like § 1983 actions against municipalities at
issue in Leatherman, employment discrimination claims were not
266
included in Rule 9(b). Also, as in Leatherman, the Court refused to
extend the Rule 9(b) exceptions to any other context absent an
267
amendment to the Rules.
268
The Swierkiewicz case, and the cases that preceded it,
demonstrate the uneasy tension that permeates the adjudication of
269
the qualified immunity defense.
By categorically forbidding lower
federal courts to use a heightened pleading standard absent
authorization from the Rules, the Court has made the extent of lower
court authority very clear: if another method of disposing of § 1983
cases emerges, it must come from a source other than willful
270
judges. Until the time when that method is made available, courts
must utilize the procedures currently available, most notably

510 (citations omitted). The plaintiff was required to plead specific facts in support
of each element. Id.
261
Id. at 509-10.
262
Id. at 510.
263
Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)).
264
See id. at 513.
265
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512-13 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b)).
266
Id. at 513.
267
Id. at 513, 515.
268
See supra Parts IV.A, B, and C (detailing Gomez, Siegert, and Leatherman).
269
See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15 (acknowledging that there may be practical
arguments supporting a heightened pleading standard in some contexts but
concluding that such a standard is impermissible under the current Rules).
270
Id.
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271

summary judgment and restricted discovery.
Considering that
courts juxtaposed between notice pleading and qualified immunity
have been rather resourceful in devising a multitude of now
discredited practices for easing the tension, it appears likely that
something will have to give. The three-step pleading scheme could
be an ideally pragmatic solution.
V. THE THREE-STEP PLEADING SCHEME—ANOTHER STEP IN THE AGEOLD DANCE
The three-step pleading scheme can trace its beginnings to the
272
city of Tomball, Texas in early 1992. Joseph M. Schultea, then the
police chief in Tomball, began looking into reports that councilman
273
Upon
David Wood was engaged in criminal activity.
recommendations by Tomball’s city manager and municipal counsel,
Schultea reported the findings of his investigation to a state oversight
274
agency. When Wood and some fellow council members discovered
Schultea’s actions, they proposed that the city council take adverse
275
action against Schultea.
After a closed council meeting, Schultea
276
was demoted to assistant police chief.
After several requests for an appeal were denied, Schultea filed a
277
§ 1983 suit.
In his complaint, Schultea alleged that his demotion
impaired his “property and liberty interests” in violation of his due
278
process rights. Also, the plaintiff alleged that the council members
infringed his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for
279
contacting the state agency.
After the district court refused to
dismiss the claims on qualified immunity grounds, the council
280
members filed an interlocutory appeal.
Although a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision
allowing the First Amendment claim to proceed, the panel diverged
from the district court’s handling of the alleged due process
281
violation.
The panel held that, inter alia, Schultea’s claims were
insufficient to show an infringement of his liberty interest in his
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281

Id.
Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1428 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1428-29.
Id. at 1429.
Id.
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1429.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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282

employment.
Specifically, the court concluded that Schultea’s
claim that his constitutionally protected employment rights had been
frustrated was inadequate because he failed to allege that he was a
283
contract employee. In addition, the complaint did not state a claim
for wrongful demotion without further allegations that the demotion
284
resulted in decreased pay or the loss of fringe benefits. The panel
remanded with allowances for Schultea to amend his complaint to
285
In so holding, the panel concluded that
state his “best case.”
because the Supreme Court had confined Leatherman to cases against
municipalities, it did not displace the Fifth Circuit’s requirement that
“complaints [in § 1983 actions against individual officials] be pled
286
with ‘factual detail and particularity.’”
Circuit Judge Higginbotham, writing for a divided Fifth Circuit
287
sitting en banc, disagreed with the panel’s decision.
The Fifth
Circuit ultimately reversed the district court on the due process
claims but remanded with instructions to apply the newly created
288
three-step pleading scheme.
Although this Comment maintains
289
that the Fifth Circuit’s logic was flawed, it is probative to explore
the path the court took to reach its conclusions. The court began by
briefly recounting the recent history of qualified immunity
290
doctrine. The court recognized that the particularity requirement
291
where it was applied to a § 1983
it had imposed in Elliott v. Perez,
292
claim against a municipality, had been struck down in Leatherman.
Although Judge Higginbotham acknowledged that Leatherman did
not reach § 1983 claims against individuals, he nonetheless
announced that the Fifth Circuit would no longer rely on Elliott or
293
the Leatherman loophole.
Instead, the court of appeals decided it
294
would employ the Rule 7 reply to take the next step in the “age-old
282

Id.
Id.
284
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1429.
285
Id.
286
Id. at 1430 (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985)).
287
Id. at 1434.
288
Id.
289
See infra Part V.B (discussing deficiencies in the Fifth Circuit’s attempted
validation of the three-step scheme).
290
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1431-32.
291
751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985).
292
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1430, 1432; see also Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 167; supra text
accompanying notes 240-47.
293
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432; see also supra text accompanying notes 248-54
(describing the Leatherman loophole).
294
FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a) (providing that “the court may order a reply to an
283
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dance of procedure and substance, here with the music of qualified
295
immunity.”
In the majority’s opinion, the reply could serve as the release
valve for the conflict between notice pleading and qualified
296
immunity.
Although the Rules ushered in the notice pleading
regime, the common law and code pleading reply was not
297
eliminated; instead, as Judge Higginbotham pointed out, it was
298
“preserved but put on the shelf, seldom to be used.” Nevertheless,
the court determined that because qualified immunity doctrine had
changed over time, so had “our perception of its practical demands
299
upon the Civil Rules moved in tandem.” The court explained that
in the three-step pleading scheme, the reply reemerges, now subject
to a heightened pleading standard, to play a pivotal role as the third
300
step.
The three-step scheme begins when the plaintiff files a short and
plain statement asserting a § 1983 claim that “rests on more than
301
conclusions alone.” At first blush, the latter part of the description
of the first step might appear to call for entirely nonconclusory
302
allegations in the complaint.
To the contrary, despite dictum
303
suggesting otherwise, Judge Higginbotham’s point is that even the

answer”).
295
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1430, 1432.
296
See id. at 1432 (stating that “[q]ualified immunity’s limits upon access to the
discovery process creates a new and large role for the Rule 7(a) reply”).
297
See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text (describing the reply retained
by the Rules).
298
Id. at 1433. Judge Higginbotham described the Rule 7 reply as:
a vestige of pre-1938 common law and code pleading expressly
preserved in the Civil Rules. At the heart of the 1938 transition to the
Civil Rules was the over-arching policy judgment that pleadings would
henceforth play a far less important role in the winnowing process.
This reduced role . . . came with the implicit direction to use the
discovery processes to put flesh on claims and defenses.
Id. at 1432-33; see also supra Part II (describing the current pleading regime, the
predecessor regimes, and their differing treatment of replies).
299
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434.
300
Id. at 1433, 1434.
301
Id. at 1433. Judge Higginbotham maintained that the Rules have always
“insisted on more than conclusions, and in this sense, have never been a system of
notice pleading.” Id. at 1431. This assertion flies in the face of precedent too
numerous to list; suffice it to say that the Supreme Court thinks differently. See, e.g.,
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). In any event, Judge Higginbotham’s
characterization of the “notice pleading regime” as a misnomer has no effective
bearing on the three-step scheme. See infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text.
302
See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1431.
303
See id.
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simplest complaint must contain some facts that give the defendant
notice of the grounds upon which the plaintiff claims to be entitled
304
to relief. Essentially, this is a merely a restatement of the minimal
requirements of the Rule 8(a)(2) and does not deviate from its
305
prescripts.
Next, the defendant government official will presumably plead
306
qualified immunity in the answer.
Finally, “the court may, in its
discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer
307
pleading the defense of qualified immunity.”
The interplay
between the second and third step forces both parties to bring
308
forward the relevant facts about what actually took place. Certainly,
the plaintiff will be required to divulge the nature of her claim by
submitting a particularized reply that is “tailored to the assertion of
309
qualified immunity and fairly engage[s] its allegations.”
The court will
insist that the reply contain specific facts, rather than general
characterizations, “at least when those factual particulars of the
alleged actions are known to the plaintiff and are not peculiarly
310
within the knowledge of [the] defendants.”
311
The defendant’s answer, however, is what controls the reply.
304

See id.
See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513 n.4. The Rules specifically instruct that their
additional appended forms “are sufficient under the rules and are intended to
indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 84. Form 9, for example, states a sample claim for negligence: “On June 1,
1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston, Massachusetts, defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff who was then crossing said
highway.” FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9, App. of Forms. Although the claim contains a
conclusion of law—that the defendant was “negligent”—it nonetheless also contains
such minimal facts as where and when the incident occurred and that driving was the
underlying activity that gave rise to the claim. Id. Because Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and
plain statement” requirement applies to the complaint in the first step of the threestep scheme, these minimal allegations are required to give at least some notice to
the defendant government official as to when and where the alleged conduct took
place. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9, App. of Forms. Additionally,
the complaint must at least state a claim that the defendant’s actions violated a
federal or constitutional right.
See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 231-32; supra text
accompanying notes 214-16. Then, in the second step, the defendant has the
opportunity to explain her role, if any, in the incident. See infra text accompanying
notes 311-14.
306
See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433-34; see also supra note 22 (explaining that the
defendant is not obligated to allege qualified immunity, but that the three-step
scheme does not apply otherwise).
307
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433-34.
308
See id. at 1433.
309
Id. (emphasis added).
310
Id. at 1432.
311
Id. at 1433.
305
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Presumably, the defendant will want the plaintiff to bring forward all
of the particulars of her claim without the need of discovery,
312
therefore potentially avoiding significant pre-trial litigation costs.
In the three-step scheme, the reply need only speak to the level of
313
specificity of the operative allegations put forth in the answer.
Thus, the Fifth Circuit explained, the defendant is provided with “an
incentive to plead his defense with some particularity because it has
314
the practical effect of requiring particularity in the reply.”
Once the allegations have been elaborated upon, the judge can
315
render judgment as a matter of law if it is appropriate. That is, the
court should dismiss the complaint if the pleadings raise no genuine
issue as to whether the defendant’s conduct amounted to a violation
of a clearly established federal or constitutional right about which a
316
reasonable person should have known.
If the plaintiff has indeed
stated a claim that calls into question the legality of the defendant’s
conduct, the court may order limited discovery confined to the
317
qualified immunity defense.
Given the ability of the second and third step to clarify the
nature of the allegations on both sides, Judge Higginbotham warned
district courts to follow the three-step scheme in almost all § 1983
318
cases against a government official.
The court advised that
protecting qualified immunity is of great importance, and, therefore,
“a district court’s discretion not to do so is narrow indeed when
319
greater detail might assist.”
The Fifth Circuit avoided Leatherman (and, in effect,
312

See id. at 1433; see also supra Part III.C (noting that cost avoidance for the
defendant has become the dominant policy reason supporting qualified immunity).
313
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
314
Id.
315
See id. at 1434.
316
Id. Technically speaking, the defendant would seek a “judgment on the
pleadings.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Rule 12(c), in turn, directs the court to treat the
motion as if it were one for Rule 56(c) summary judgment only if “matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court.” Compare FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(c), with FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (instructing the court to consider pleadings as well
as “depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions . . . [and] affidavits”).
Naturally, unless some discovery is absolutely necessary, a court employing the threestep scheme will want to avoid that scenario. See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434. Of course,
if the purpose of qualified immunity is to avoid litigation costs, then when rendering
judgment as a matter of law, “it is no answer to say that the plaintiff has not yet had
the opportunity to engage in discovery.” Siegert, 500 U.S. at 236 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
317
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434.
318
See id. at 1433-34.
319
Id.
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Swierkiewicz)
by circumventing the limitations of Rule 9(b).
Instead, the court maintained that the three-step scheme is valid
because a heightened pleading standard is applied only to the Rule 7
322
reply.
According to Judge Higginbotham, the only restriction on
the level of factual specificity that a court may demand in a reply is
Rule 8(e)(1)’s specification “that ‘[e]ach averment of a pleading
323
shall be simple, concise, and direct.’” Highlighting that Rule 9(b)
particularized complaints are likewise governed by the same “simple,
concise, and direct” standard, the court did not consider Rule
324
8(e)(1) as a limitation on Rule 7 replies.
Next, the court asserted that Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain
statement” standard also did not apply to replies; instead, the court
explained, “Rule 8 applies only to the subset of pleadings that ‘set[]
forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim,
325
cross-claim, or third-party claim.’”
The court invoked the same
principle that the Supreme Court relied on to strike down the
heightened pleading standard in Leatherman—expressio unius est
326
exclusio alterius.
That is, Rule 8(a)(2)’s limitations were not
germane because the list of pleadings did not specifically include
327
Rule 7 replies.
A. Why Schultea is Right

There are several reasons why the three-step pleading scheme is
a desirable solution to the problem caused by qualified immunity
328
converging on notice pleading. Admittedly, the reasons are based
on policy considerations as opposed to a strict adherence to the Rules
329
or to Supreme Court precedent. Nevertheless, the reasons present
a compelling case for why the three-step pleading scheme, with a
330
minor adjustment, ought to be adopted. First, the scheme furthers
320

See supra note 18 (noting that Schultea was decided prior to Swierkiewicz).
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432, 1434.
322
Id. at 1432-33.
323
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)(1)).
324
Id.; see also infra note 370 (describing Judge Higginbotham’s contention that
Rule 8(e)(1) fails to provide a “relevant restriction” on Rule 7(a) replies).
325
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)) (alteration in original).
326
Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 245 (quoting Leatherman).
327
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
328
For case law demonstrating the difficulty in reconciling qualified immunity
and notice pleading, see supra Part IV.
329
See infra Part V.B (demonstrating that the Schultea scheme exceeds the
boundaries of the Rules as interpreted by the Supreme Court).
330
See infra notes 380-84, 388, and accompanying text (advocating a mandatory
rather than discretionary reply).
321
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the overarching goal of cost avoidance by encouraging a
determination of the qualified immunity issue at the earliest possible
331
juncture, the pleading stage. Second, although unequivocally more
332
friendly to defendants, the scheme treats both sides in § 1983 cases
more fairly than do the alternatives, such as subjecting the defendant
333
to even limited discovery or imposing a heightened pleading
334
standard on complaints.
When dealing with issues of qualified immunity, the primary
335
consideration is social cost avoidance.
In developing qualified
immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court has clearly settled on
avoiding the imposition of costs on government defendants (and
thereby indirectly on society) who may face lawsuits as the result of
336
performing their legally required job obligations.
The current
policy of disposing of frivolous claims early using limited discovery
and summary judgment, however, creates a paradox: the Court has
emphasized early termination of § 1983 cases while simultaneously
337
demanding rigid adherence to the strictures of notice pleading.
Unlike the current system, the three-step scheme has the advantage
of making the qualified immunity determination a more reaching
338
threshold inquiry. In fact, as Judge Higginbotham pointed out, the
three-step scheme does not entirely displace the current tools of
339
Rather, the scheme
limited discovery and summary judgment.
simply provides the judge another tool with which to weed out
340
frivolous suits before the costly discovery process has commenced.
The three-step pleading scheme is also desirable because it
spreads the burden of pleading between both litigants; the specificity
331

See infra notes 335-40 and accompanying text (discussing how the scheme can
potentially dispose of meritless claims).
332
See infra notes 359-62 and accompanying text (explaining that the scheme
favors defendant government officials).
333
See infra notes and accompanying text 341-43 (describing the deficiencies of
limited discovery).
334
See infra notes 344-46 and accompanying text (describing the deficiencies of a
heightened pleading standard in the complaint).
335
See supra Part III.A (discussing qualified immunity’s policy shift toward
reducing litigation costs for government officials and society).
336
Id.
337
See Chen, supra note 142, at 98-99.
338
The Supreme Court stated that until the threshold immunity inquiry is
resolved, discovery should not be allowed.
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
Notwithstanding, the current system of resolving the issue of qualified immunity
relies on “summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious
claims sooner rather than later.” Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69.
339
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434.
340
See id.
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required in the plaintiff’s reply depends upon, and is proportional to,
341
Deciding
the defendant’s level of particularity in the answer.
between other alternatives—strictly following the notice pleading
requirements of the Rules or requiring particularized complaints
(assuming Rule 9(b) was amended to include § 1983 claims)—
requires choosing one pole or the other on the spectrum between
the policies underlying qualified immunity and notice pleading.
Either extreme invariably favors one side of the suit at the expense of
the other. The three-step scheme, however, is a choice that falls
toward the middle of the spectrum, if decidedly nearer to the
342
qualified immunity pole.
The current choice, ubiquitous notice pleading, favors the
plaintiff at the expense of the defendant government official because
of its reliance on discovery. Specifically, the defendant often must
relinquish some of her entitlement—freedom from suit—and submit
to discovery to determine if the entitlement even applies, thereby
derailing the goal of social cost avoidance. Such an inherently
paradoxical relationship is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to
logically reconcile with a defense that is intended to block pre-trial
litigation. In contrast, the three-step pleading scheme fortifies the
protections for the defendant against having to comply with costly
discovery, even if it does not eliminate every instance where some
343
discovery may be needed.
Similarly, imposing a heightened pleading standard on the
complaint by amending Rule 9(b) would inflict an undue burden on
344
the plaintiff. The Court has made it abundantly clear that qualified
immunity is an affirmative defense, not an element of a § 1983
345
claim.
It is improper, then, to base the plaintiff’s initial pleading
burden on a defense that has not been, and might never be, pleaded
346
by the defendant.
The three-step scheme, however, does not present the same
problems. If, for example, the defendant issues vague denials in the

341

Id. at 1433; see also Gary T. Lester, Comment, Schultea II—Fifth Circuit’s Answer to
Leatherman—Rule 7 Reply: More Questions than Answers in Civil Rights Cases?, 37 S. TEX.
L. REV. 413, 446-49 (1996) (describing the burden shifting in the three-step scheme).
342
See infra text accompanying notes 359-62 (explaining that the scheme favors
defendants).
343
See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434.
344
See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 641 (1980) (explaining that there is “no
basis for imposing on the plaintiff an obligation to anticipate . . . a defense” of
qualified immunity).
345
See id.; supra Part IV.A (discussing Gomez).
346
See Gomez, 446 U.S. at 641.
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answer, then the plaintiff faces a less onerous specificity obligation in
347
In such a scenario, the judge may refuse to render
the reply.
judgment on the pleadings but instead may proceed to limited
348
discovery.
The defendant, therefore, has an incentive to explain
349
her conduct using particular facts to forestall further proceedings.
If the answer provides a detailed account of what occurred and why
the defendant’s conduct deserves qualified immunity, the plaintiff
“must put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations which
350
establish [a constitutional or statutory violation].”
351
For illustration, consider the factual circumstances in Schultea.
Assume that the plaintiff had pleaded allegations in a relatively
conclusory manner: “Defendant city council members violated my
liberty and property interests by demoting me without due process of
the law.” Although the plaintiff’s allegation that he was demoted is a
factual allegation, the statements that his “liberty and property
interests” were “violated” and that this violation occurred “without
due process” are conclusions of law. This pleading would almost
certainly satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s notice requirement; the defendants
would have “fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim[s] [are] and the
352
grounds upon which [they] rest[].”
Next, assume that the defendant council members respond by
pleading qualified immunity supported by detailed factual allegations
about the council meeting: where and when it occurred, who
attended, the business that was discussed, whether legal formalities
were observed, and the reason for the plaintiff’s demotion. The
plaintiff would then be required to file a reply that contained
sufficiently specific allegations “establishing [the] plaintiff’s right of
recovery, including detailed facts supporting the contention that [a]
353
plea of immunity cannot be sustained.” Suppose, for example, that
the plaintiff then alleged in the reply that because he was a contract
employee, the demotion frustrated his constitutionally protected
354
property interest in his employment.
The trial judge would then
evaluate the pleadings, taking the plaintiff’s allegations as true, and
347
See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433; see also Marcus, supra note 31, at 452 (asserting
that a party “hardly needs specificity to deny a vague allegation”).
348
Id. at 1434.
349
Id.
350
Siegert, 500 U.S. at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
351
See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1428-29; supra text accompanying notes 272-79
(reporting the relevant facts of Schultea).
352
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
353
Elliot, 751 F.2d at 1482.
354
See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1429.
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ascertain whether they made out a violation of the plaintiff’s “clearly
355
established” constitutional or statutory rights.
Continuing the illustration, consider that despite the plaintiff’s
allegation in the reply that he was a contract employee, it was still
unclear whether the defendants had violated the plaintiff’s rights.
For example, if the determination of a violation hinged on the
veracity of the defendants’ account of the council meeting and
whether there was an irregularity of proper process (e.g., whether the
plaintiff was wrongfully denied an appeal of the council decision),
the plaintiff could not be expected without discovery to overcome
356
those allegations.
At this point, counseled Judge Higginbotham,
limited discovery may be necessary because this determination of
qualified immunity “turn[s] on facts peculiarly within the knowledge
357
of the defendants.”
Without the reply, the fact that the plaintiff
had an employment contract may not have surfaced until discovery
had commenced. Were the plaintiff not a contract employee, the
details of the meeting would have been irrelevant and discovery may
have begun unnecessarily. Although, in this illustration, the threestep scheme did not entirely obviate the need for further
proceedings, the reply narrowed the factual and legal issues to be
358
determined.
This obvious potential for weeding out meritless
litigation (i.e., if there had been no employment contract)
exemplifies why the three-step scheme has merit.
To be certain, as the previous illustration demonstrates, the
three-step scheme is defendant-friendly; it will erect another barrier
359
in the path of § 1983 claimants.
Indeed, forcing the plaintiff to
reveal more of her case at an early point in the suit, even forcing her
355

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (acknowledging that
certain cases, such as those involving police searches, will often result in conflicting
allegations making limited discovery possibly appropriate).
357
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1432.
358
This, of course, is much like the old common law pleading regime. See supra
Part II.A. The three-step scheme would stop at this point, however, rather than
requiring an exhaustive exchange of responsive pleadings. See Schultea, 47 F.3d at
1434. So long as the plaintiff’s reply “support[s] his claim with sufficient precision
and factual specificity to raise a genuine issue of the illegality of defendant’s conduct
at the time of the alleged acts,” limited discovery can commence. Id.
359
If the defendant can eliminate a claim at this early point, this will obviously
benefit the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff. See supra text accompanying
notes 341-58 (identifying cost avoidance as the predominant policy of qualified
immunity). But see Lester, supra note 341, at 469-70 (pointing out that the incentive
for the answer to be pleaded with particularity imposes a new burden on defendants
and positing that the three-step scheme will “guarantee that lawsuits will take longer
to complete, not reduce the time or costs for either the defendant or the plaintiff”).
356
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to confront the spectre of facts that may be “peculiarly within the
360
knowledge and control of the defendant,” will often put the
361
plaintiff at a decided disadvantage.
The three-step scheme,
however, at least provides the plaintiff with the benefits of notice of
the affirmative defense of qualified immunity and a detailed
362
explanation of how and why it applies.
Requiring heightened
pleading in the complaint deprives the plaintiff of even this
explanation from the defendant. Despite the potential unfairness,
the policy considerations behind the substantive right of qualified
immunity demand this deviation from the ordinary notice pleading
system.
B. Why Schultea is Wrong
The Schultea pleading scheme is certainly not immune to
363
criticism.
Most significantly, although the scheme is a desirable
outcome, it ultimately relies on manipulating the Rules and ignoring
the Supreme Court’s instruction that particularity requirements be
mandated by the Rules’ amendment process, not created in the
364
course of adjudication. Therefore, the scheme, like all of the other
judicial innovations designed to resolve the conflict between qualified
365
immunity and notice pleading, exceeds court authority. Also, even
assuming that the scheme is permissible under the existing Rules, two
additional unresolved issues remain. First, Schultea leaves uncertain
what level of review appellate courts should apply to decisions
366
whether to order a reply.
Second, the lack of a uniform standard
367
among the circuits cannot be justified.
Although the Fifth Circuit concededly presented a clever
368
argument in finding support in the Rules, the argument is flawed.
Essentially, the court claimed that it could impose a heightened
pleading standard, truly an exceptional power in a notice pleading

360

Gomez, 446 U.S. at 641.
Id. (“There may be no way for a plaintiff to know in advance whether the
official has such a belief or, indeed, whether he will even claim that he does.”).
362
See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.
363
See, e.g., Lester, supra note 341, at 460-65.
364
See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514-15.
365
See infra notes 368-79 and accompanying text (explaining that the Rules do not
authorize the three-step scheme).
366
See infra notes 380-84 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertain level of
appellate review after Schultea).
367
See infra notes 385-86 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of uniformity
if only the Fifth Circuit employed the three-step scheme).
368
See generally Lester, supra note 341.
361
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system, without express authority from the Rules. When searching
for the standard that governs Rule 7 replies, the court focused on
370
Rule 8(a)(2). The court pointed out that replies are not included
371
in the discrete list of “pleading[s] that set forth a claim for relief.”
It is arguable, however, that a reply does, in fact, set forth a claim
because it supplements a complaint, which by definition sets forth a
claim. If so, replies would be subject to Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short and
plain statement” restriction and, therefore, a particularity
372
requirement would be improper.
More distressing is the court’s assumption of a power that is not
373
expressed in the Rules. As the review of the history of pleadings has
374
a heightened pleading standard is clearly an
demonstrated,
375
extraordinary imposition in our current notice pleading regime.
Although the court presumed that the Rules do not affirmatively
376
govern the content of Rule 7 replies, it is something else altogether
377
to presume that the void should be filled by a judicial whim.
Because the Fifth Circuit could find no standard to restrict courtordered replies, it decided to impose just such a “requirement of
378
greater specificity” that Swierkiewicz found so objectionable.
In a
notice pleading regime, an exceptional practice requires an
exceptional mandate: no pleading need be particularized without an
379
express directive from the Rules.
Further complicating the Schultea scheme are issues with its

369

See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434.
Id. at 1433. In the first part of his defense of the three-step scheme, Judge
Higginbotham rightly pointed out that Rule 8(e)(1) does not place a “relevant
restriction” on replies because Rule 8(e)(1) applies to particularized Rule 9(b)
complaints as well. Id. Because this appears to be correct, this Comment will focus
on the judge’s other justifications.
371
Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
372
See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513.
373
See Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433 (opining that the Rules do not place any “relevant
limitation upon the content” of a reply and that, therefore, the court is free to
impose a specificity standard of its own creation); see also supra note 370 and
accompanying text.
374
See supra Part II (reviewing the history of pleadings and procedure).
375
See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 513-14 (describing notice pleading as the norm and
asserting that “Rule 8(e)(1) states that ‘[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions
are required’”).
376
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433; see also supra note 370 and accompanying text.
377
See id. at 1437 n.3 (Garza, J., specially concurring) (noting that, despite the
majority’s contentions, the Rules “do not empower the district court to require that a
reply be ‘detailed’”).
378
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515.
379
See id. at 513-14.
370
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potentially inconsistent administration.
Unresolved questions
remain, for instance, regarding the applicable standard of review of a
380
decision not to order a reply. Rule 7(a) provides that a court “may
381
order a reply”; this is the type of permissive judicial action that faces
382
“abuse of discretion” review on appeal.
Judge Higginbotham,
however, warned that “a district court’s discretion not to [order a
383
reply] is narrow indeed when greater detail might assist.”
What
exactly the judge meant by “narrow” is unclear but the implication is
unmistakable: a district court that decides not to require a Rule 7
reply will face close scrutiny, perhaps even de facto plenary review, of
384
that decision.
Notwithstanding the suspect propriety of a court of
appeals transforming a discretionary practice into a mandatory one,
clarification, at a minimum, would help to apprise courts and litigants
of what level of review to expect when challenging a court’s decision
whether or not to order a reply.
The final issue with Schultea is a common refrain whenever
standards differ among the circuits: there is no logical reason why
plaintiffs and defendants should face different procedures in
385
different courts in the federal system. One of the main goals of the
proponents of the Rules was, after all, to achieve procedural
386
uniformity among the federal courts.
The policies of cost
avoidance are almost undoubtedly as relevant in all of the federal
districts as they are in the Fifth Circuit. Lack of uniformity will
continue to plague the three-step scheme until Schultea is either
overturned or adopted into the Rules.
380

Circuit Judge Garza, in a concurrence, questioned the propriety of the
majority’s apparent limitation on the district court’s discretion whether to order a
Rule 7 reply. Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1437 (Garza, J., specially concurring). Judge Garza
concluded that “[s]uch a limitation on the district court’s discretion is not contained
in Rule 7(a).” Id. This concern is resolved by the proposed amendment to the Rules
provided at the conclusion of this Comment. See infra Part V.C.
381
FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a) (emphasis added).
382
Traylor v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 189 F.2d 213, 216 (8th Cir. 1951)
(holding that the trial court has discretion whether to order a reply); see also supra
notes 116-21 and accompanying text (describing the Fifth Circuit’s admonition to
lower courts to order a reply in § 1983 actions).
383
Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434.
384
See id.; see also Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (characterizing
the standard of review as “abuse of discretion” but reiterating that that discretion is
“narrow indeed”).
385
See, e.g., LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform
Through Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Cases, 2002 UCLA J. L.
& TECH. 1, 48 (2002) (asserting that “[i]ncreased uniformity and predictability in
adjudication almost invariably leads to enhanced judicial credibility and the resultant
desired effect of stabilization within a given body of law”).
386
Holtzoff, supra note 36, at 1062-63; Subrin, supra note 26, at 967.
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C. Amending the Rules and Righting the Wrong
The three-step pleading scheme is not a perfect solution; when
legal doctrines such as qualified immunity and notice pleading
387
converge, there seldom are resolutions that please everyone.
The
three-step pleading scheme, however, represents a careful balancing
of the policies involved and a guarded rejection of the other available
options for resolving the conflict. Therefore, the scheme should be
legitimized by amending the Rules. A proposed draft amendment
might read like this:
In actions against a government official where the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity is raised in the answer, the court
shall order that the plaintiff file a reply that is tailored to the
assertion of qualified immunity and fairly engages its allegations.

There are many reasons for adopting the amendment. It would
eliminate the problem of the appropriate standard of review by
making the particularized reply compulsory in § 1983 cases,
guaranteeing de novo appellate review of decisions whether to order a
388
reply.
The circuits would no longer lack uniformity because the
three-step scheme would be applied in all federal courts as a
mandatory part of the Rules. Most importantly, however, judges
trapped between the immovable object of notice pleading and the
irresistible force of qualified immunity would have another method
of resolving the dilemma before the next stage of pre-trial litigation.
Certainly, one criticism of the three-step scheme is only too
obvious: it resembles the failed pleading regimes that the America
389
legal system worked so diligently to escape from.
A narrow
resurrection of a past practice, however, is entirely justified when
irreconcilable fundamental doctrines clash.
Professor Subrin
perhaps states it best:
Our infatuation with [the equity-dominated Rules] has helped us
to forget the historic purpose of adjudication. Courts exist not
only to resolve disputes, but to resolve them in a way that takes law
seriously. . . . We have, however, largely failed at defining rights
390
and providing methods for their efficient vindication.
387
See, e.g., Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S at. 514-15. Another appropriate example of an
ongoing conflict between doctrines is represented by the merger of law and equity;
the predictability of the common law has not, and may never, mesh entirely with the
flexibility of equity. See Subrin, supra note 26, at 1000-02.
388
See supra notes 380-84 (discussing the uncertainty of the standard of appellate
review after Schultea).
389
See supra Part II (recounting the transition from prior pleading regimes to the
Rules).
390
Subrin, supra note 26, at 1001.
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Particularized replies may currently be in disfavor, but they can again
serve an important purpose by helping to protect public officials’
391
rights to qualified immunity.
If qualified immunity is truly to be
immunity from suit, it should not take a lawsuit to make that
determination; rather, the three-step pleading scheme should be
formally adopted and implemented.

391

Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433.

